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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1986 Congress passed the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(COBRA).2  This legislation amended the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA)3 by requiring employers to offer group health insurance coverage to 
terminated employees for a specific time period after termination.  The purpose of 
                                                                
1Chicago-Kent College of Law, J.D. 1985; St. Louis University School of Law, L.L.M. in 
Health Law, 1999.  The author is a member of Lashly & Baer, P.C., St. Louis, Missouri and 
specializes in health law. 
229 U. S. C. §§ 1161-1169 (1999). 
329 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999).  It also amended the Public Health Service Act and the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
2 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 14:1 
this legislation was to provide for “the growing number of Americans without any 
health insurance coverage and the decreasing willingness of our Nation’s hospitals to 
provide care to those who cannot afford to pay.”4  
The statute requires that the group health insurance coverage extend for eighteen 
months or thirty-six months, depending upon the qualifying event, or until “[t]he 
date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election, 
covered under any other group health plan.”5  There has been a split among the 
Circuits as to the meaning of the “first becomes” statutory language and how this 
language should be applied when a terminated employee has preexisting coverage 
through his or her spouse’s employer at the time of termination and makes an 
election for COBRA continuation coverage. 
The Tenth and Seventh Circuits have held that the employee is not disqualified 
from obtaining COBRA continuation coverage because of the spouse’s preexisting 
group health insurance coverage.6  The Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits, on the 
other hand,  have held that the employee is disqualified from obtaining continuation 
coverage because of the spouse’s preexisting group health insurance coverage.7  The 
Supreme Court recently decided the Eighth Circuit case regarding the issue of an 
employee’s right to COBRA continuation coverage when the employee has 
preexisting spousal coverage.8  
This Paper will discuss the relevant statutes, case law and the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp.9  It concludes that the Supreme Court 
correctly reversed the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Geissal by applying the plain 
meaning of the statute and rejecting the “significant gap” theory.  James Geissal was 
entitled to COBRA continuation coverage even though his wife had preexisting 
group health insurance coverage.  The Fifth, Eleventh and Eighth Circuits’ 
significant gap theory is not supported by the plain meaning of the statute or 
Congress’ intent.  The employee should have the choice to elect COBRA or decide 
whether different coverage is in his or her best interest.  As long as the employee 
bears the risk and pays the premiums during the limited time period provided by 
COBRA the courts should not supplant their own views as to what constitutes 
adequate coverage or whether there is a significant “gap” in health insurance 
coverage between the employee’s coverage and the spouse’s coverage. 
Part I of this paper will provide a background analysis of the statutory provision 
at issue and discuss the holdings of the Circuit Courts of Appeal.  Part II of this 
paper will analyze the Geissal case.  Part III of this paper will conclude that the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in the Geissal case is the only possible decision that could 
                                                                
4H. R. Rep. No. 99-241, pt. 1, at 44, 44 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 622. 
529 U. S. C. § 1162 (2)(D)(i) (1999).   
6Oakley v. City of Longmont, 890 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
Lutheran Hosp. of Indiana, Inc., v. Men’s Assurance Co. of America, 51 F.3d 1308, 1315 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
7Brock v. Primedica, 904 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1990); National Cos. Health Benefit Plan 
v. St. Joseph Hosp. of Atlanta. Inc., 929 F.2d 1558, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991); Geissal v. Moore 
Med. Corp., 114 F.3d 1458, 1465 (8th Cir. 1997) rev’d. 524 U.S. 74 (1998). 
8See Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. 141 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1998). 
9Id. 
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preserve the plain meaning of the statute and limit judicial intrusion into the group 
health insurance arena. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  COBRA 
The obligation to provide COBRA continuation coverage applies to employers 
with twenty or more employees.10  The statute requires that the “qualified beneficiary 
who would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event is entitled, 
under the plan, to elect within the election period, continuation coverage under the 
plan.”11  A “qualified beneficiary” is defined as the individual employee or an 
individual, whom on the day before the qualifying event for the employee, is a plan 
beneficiary as the individual’s spouse or dependent child.12  A “qualifying event” is 
defined as an event which would, but for the continuation coverage provisions, result 
in the loss of coverage for the beneficiary.13  The covered qualifying events are as 
follows: 
1. The death of the employee; 
2. Termination (other than for reasons of gross misconduct) or reduction of 
hours of employment; 
3. Divorce or legal separation of the employee and the employee’s spouse; 
4. The covered employee’s qualification for Medicare; 
5. The loss of dependent status under the terms of the plan for a previously 
dependent child; 
6. A bankruptcy proceeding against the employer.14 
In order to obtain COBRA continuation coverage, a qualified beneficiary must 
make an election to continue coverage no later than sixty days after the date on 
which the coverage terminates because of a qualifying event.15  The type of 
continuation coverage that must be made available to the qualified beneficiary is 
“coverage which, as of the time the coverage is being provided, is identical to the 
coverage provided, under the plan to similarly situated beneficiaries under the plan” 
whose coverage has not been terminated.16  The qualified beneficiary must pay the 
insurance premiums which the employer may set at no more than 102% of the 
premium for similarly situated beneficiaries.17  After a beneficiary elects COBRA 
coverage, coverage begins on the date of the qualifying event and ends eighteen 
months after the date of the qualifying event except in the case of bankruptcies, death 
                                                                
1029 U.S.C. § 1161(b) (1999). 
11Id. at § 1161(a). 
1229 U.S.C. § 1167(3) (1999). 
1329 U.S.C. § 1163 (1999). 
14Id. 
1529 U.S.C. § 1165(1) (1999). 
1629 U.S.C. § 1162(1) (1999). 
1729 U.S.C. § 1162(3) (1999). 
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of the employee or beneficiary, or other circumstances involving spouses and 
dependents.18 
The employer’s obligation to provide continuation coverage terminates after 
eighteen or thirty-six months, or when the qualified beneficiary “first becomes, after 
the date of the election[,] covered under any other group health plan.”19  The 
pertinent portions of the statute as originally written in April of 1986 are as follows: 
 
SEC. 602  CONTINUATION COVERAGE. 
For purposes of section 601, the term ‘continuation coverage’ means 
coverage under the plan which meets the following requirements: 
(1) TYPE OF BENEFIT COVERAGE.  * * * 
(2) PERIOD OF COVERAGE.  The coverage must extend for at least the 
period beginning on the date of the qualifying event and ending not earlier 
than the earliest of the following: 
(A) MAXIMUM PERIOD.  * * * 
(B) END OF PLAN.  * * *  
(C) FAILURE TO PAY PREMIUM.  * * * 
(D) REEMPLOYMENT OR MEDICARE ELIGIBILITY.  
The date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the 
date of the election – 
(i)a covered employee under any other group health plan, or20 
 
Therefore, as originally written, the statute contemplated that COBRA 
continuation coverage would stop if the maximum time period were reached, the 
employer ceased providing health insurance coverage, the beneficiary failed to pay 
premiums or the beneficiary became eligible for medicare or obtained new 
employment and group health insurance coverage.  Clearly, “reemployment” and 
becoming a “covered employee” pertained to after-acquired coverage. 
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress again amended the statute to 
make it clear that any other after-acquired group health insurance coverage could 
terminate COBRA rights.  The pertinent portions of the October, 1986 amendments 
are as follows: 
 
SEC. 602 CONTINUATION COVERAGE.  
* * *  
(2) PERIOD OF COVERAGE.  * * *  
(D) GROUP HEALTH PLAN COVERAGE OR MEDICARE 
ELIGIBILITY. 
The date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of 
the election - 
(i) covered under any other group health plan (as an employee or 
otherwise), or21 
                                                                
1829 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(A)(iii) (1999).  If a second qualifying event occurs during the 
eighteen month continuation coverage period, the period of coverage is extended to thirty-six 
months.  29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(A)(ii) (1999).  
1929 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i) (1999). 
20Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 
228 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i) (1999)). 
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This meant that a qualified beneficiary could lose COBRA benefits not only if 
the beneficiary became reemployed and covered under any other group health plan 
but also if the beneficiary became covered by group health insurance as a result of 
marriage or remarriage.  Since the “first becomes, after” language was not amended 
Congress clearly intended only after-acquired coverage to terminate COBRA 
eligibility. 
The clause was amended once again in 1989 to ensure that the beneficiary would 
not be forced to accept after-acquired coverage that contained exclusions or 
limitations regarding preexisting conditions.  That amendment read as follows: 
 
SEC. 602 CONTINUATION COVERAGE. 
* * *  
(2) PERIOD OF COVERAGE. * * *  
(D) GROUP HEALTH PLAN COVERAGE OR MEDICARE 
ENTITLEMENT. 
The date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of 
the election - 
(i) covered under any other group health plan, (as an employee or 
otherwise) which does not contain any exclusion or limitation with 
respect to any preexisting condition of such beneficiary, or22 
 
The legislative history behind these provisions is minimal, however based on the 
plain meaning of the statute it is clear that Congress intended that after-acquired 
coverage would disqualify the beneficiary from COBRA benefits.  The disqualifying 
after-acquired coverage would occur by reason of reemployment and also by reason 
of after-acquired dependent coverage.  For example, if a qualified beneficiary’s 
spouse became entitled to group health benefits, the qualified beneficiary could 
choose to be covered as a dependent under his spouse’s coverage and terminate 
COBRA. The spouse of a qualified beneficiary who elected COBRA by reason of 
death or divorce could also by remarrying, choose to become entitled to group health 
insurance coverage as an eligible dependent of the new spouse’s policy.  
There is nothing in the statute to suggest that the beneficiary is required to 
terminate COBRA before the eighteen months or thirty-six months if the premiums 
for the replacement insurance are cheaper or free.  There is also nothing in the statute 
to suggest that the beneficiary is entitled to maintain COBRA if the replacement 
policy provides less coverage or a “significant gap” in coverage than the COBRA 
coverage. 
                                                          
21Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, Sec. 1895, 100 Stat. 2938-39 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.§ 1162(2)(D)(i) (1999)). 
22Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, Sec. 7862, 103 Stat. 
2432 (1989) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i) (1999)).  The most recent 
amendment to the statute occurred in 1996 by addition of the following words between 
“beneficiary,” and “or.”  The amendment is as follows:  “(other than such an exclusion or 
limitation which does not apply to (or is satisfied by) such beneficiary by reason of chapter 
100 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, part 7 of this subtitle, or title XXVII of the Public 
Health Service Act).” Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
104-191, Sec. 421, 110 Stat. 2088 (1996) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i) 
1999)). 
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B.  The Tenth Circuit 
The first case to deal with Section 1162(2)(D)(i) and the continuation coverage 
issue was Oakley v. City of Longmont.23  James Oakley suffered a permanent head 
injury when he was involved in an automobile collision with a drunk driver.  At the 
time of the accident he was employed by the City of Longmont (City) as a fire 
fighter and was covered by the City’s medical plan.24  He was also covered as a 
dependent under the group health plan of his wife’s employer. 
The City first informed him that he was not eligible to maintain his medical 
insurance coverage for an additional eighteen months because he was a dependent 
under his wife’s plan.25  He was later notified of his option to continue his prior 
medical overage for eighteen months by making the premium payments himself. The 
election form was timely returned.  At the time of his termination he was a patient at 
the Bear Creek Rehabilitation Center.  His wife’s coverage however, did not 
reimburse for the cost of the rehabilitative treatment.  He sued to continue his 
medical coverage with the City.  The district court denied declaratory and injunctive 
relief and Mr. Oakley appealed.26 
The Tenth Circuit determined that COBRA continuation coverage ends on “[t]he 
date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes after the date of the election 
covered under any other group health plan (as an employee or otherwise).”27 
According to the plain meaning of the statutory language, the court held that Mr. 
Oakley was not disqualified from COBRA coverage even though he was covered 
under his wife’s group health plan.  The court stated: 
When we read the underlined introductory language in conjunction with 
‘covered under any other group health plan (as an employee or 
otherwise),’ we believe the plain meaning of this subsection cannot be 
construed to include a spouse’s preexisting group plan as a condition to 
terminate continuation coverage.  Indeed, Mr. Oakley did not ‘first 
become’ covered under his wife’s policy after the qualifying event that 
resulted in his termination from the City’s employment.  Nor did 
Congress intend a covered employee’s termination to become a condition 
triggering ‘other’ coverage under a spouse’s preexisting group plan.  
Consequently, only when we read the language of subsection (i) to refer to 
other coverage occurring after the qualifying event, do we preserve its 
plain meaning and give effect to Congress’ intent.28 
                                                                
23890 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990). 
24Id. at 1130.  He was covered by the “City of Longmont Medical and Dental Care 
Expense Reimbursement Plan.”  Id. 
25Id. 
26Id. 
27Id. at 1132 (quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-2(2)(D)(i).  The Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1161, contains the same continuation coverage rules 
and identical provisions as found in the Public Health Service Act at issue here and the 
Internal Revenue Code.  See, e.g. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2).  Id. at 1131. 
28Oakley, 890 F.2d at 1132. 
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The court relied on congressional history and a reading of the statute as a 
whole.29  According to the House Conference Report regarding the duration of 
coverage, “no coverage need be provided after (1) failure to make timely payment 
under the plan, (2) the qualified beneficiary is covered under another group health 
plan as a result of employment, reemployment, or remarriage, and (3) the qualified 
beneficiary becomes entitled to Medicare benefits.”30  The court concluded that 
“Congress intended this language to refer to subsequent events related to the 
employee’s own employment or marital status” and since Mr. Oakley had not 
obtained new employment, was not  reemployed, and had not remarried he still 
qualified for COBRA continuation coverage.31 
C.  The Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the identical statutory language regarding COBRA 
continuation coverage as the Tenth Circuit but came to the opposite conclusion in 
Brock v. Primedica, Inc.32  In Brock, the plaintiff, Karin Brock, had health insurance 
as a Primedica employee and was also covered as a dependent on her husband’s 
group health insurance plan.33  Prior to her resignation, she received a form letter 
from her employer advising her that she was entitled to continue her group health 
insurance coverage under COBRA unless she was covered by any other group health 
plans.34  Despite the letter, she sought to continue her coverage under COBRA and 
paid the premiums.  Subsequently, when Primedica learned that she was covered 
under her husband’s policy, Primedica denied her medical claims, notified her of her 
ineligibility for COBRA and refunded her premium.35  The district court granted 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the grounds that Brock was not 
entitled to continuation coverage and her state law claims were preempted by 
ERISA.36  The Brocks appealed.37 
The continuation coverage language had been amended shortly after the Oakley 
decision and provided that coverage ceases on the date when the beneficiary “first 
                                                                
29Id. 
30131 CONG. REC. 38,285-86 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985). 
31Oakley, 890 F.2d at 1132.  Even though the legislative history did not specifically 
address the language “covered (as an employee or otherwise)” the court was satisfied that the 
overall statutory scheme contemplated continuation coverage to remain available to an 
employee despite a spouse’s preexisting insurance coverage.  Id. at 1133. 
32904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1990).  The Brock case was brought under ERISA.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1162(2)(D)(i) (1999).  
33Brock, 904 F.2d, at 296.  
34Id. 
35Id. 
36Id. 
37The plaintiff’s primary argument on appeal was that she was not informed of any 
limitations on her eligibility, and, after having accepted the premiums, Primedica should be 
estopped from denying benefits.  The court rejected this argument  based on the form letter 
and because she conceded that she was so informed.  The estoppel argument raised for the first 
time on appeal was also not properly before the court.  Id. 
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becomes, after the date of the election covered under any other group health plan (as 
an employee or otherwise) which does not contain any exclusion or limitation with 
respect to any preexisting conditions of such beneficiary.”38  The Brock court 
reasoned that the amendment emphasized “Congress’ concern that group health plan 
participants and their dependents not be placed in a situation in which they suffer a 
gap in the character of coverage as the result of a [‘]qualifying event[’] such as 
termination of employment.”39  The Fifth Circuit distinguished the Brock case from 
the Oakley case because Oakley’s rehabilitation was not covered by his wife’s 
employer’s policy but was covered by Oakley’s employer’s policy, and therefore, a 
“gap” in coverage occurred.40  Since no “gap” in coverage occurred in Karin Brock’s 
case the court held that based on congressional intent and the express mandate of the 
statute she was not entitled to elect continuation coverage under COBRA.41 
D.  The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit held that an insurer was estopped from disclaiming an 
obligation to provide continuing group health coverage for a period of thirty-six 
months when the ERISA provider misinformed the employee about his rights under 
COBRA continuation coverage and the employee relied on that information to his 
detriment.42  In National Companies Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph’s Hospital of 
Atlanta, Inc., the plaintiff Robert Hersh elected COBRA continuation coverage when 
he resigned from the National Distributing Company (NDC).43  He was also covered 
under the ERISA group health plan of his wife Janet’s employer, St. Joseph’s 
Hospital of Atlanta (St. Joseph’s).44  After Mrs. Hersh delivered twins three months 
prematurely, NDC informed Mr. Hersh that he was ineligible for continuation 
coverage and his claims were denied.  In their lawsuit against NDC, the district court 
held that NDC was estopped from disclaiming an obligation to provide continuing 
group health coverage to the Hershes for a period of thirty-six months and also 
awarded the Hershes damages, attorneys’ fees and costs.45  NDC appealed.46 
                                                                
38See 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i). 
39See Brock v. Primedica, 904 F.2d at 297 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-247 at 1452-53, 
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2922-23). 
40Id. at 297. 
41Id. 
42See National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Atlanta, Inc., 929 F.2d 
1558, 1566 (11th Cir. 1991). 
43Id. at 1561. 
44Prior to Mr. Hersh’s resignation he and his wife Janet both had obtained family 
coverage.  The National Plan served as primary insurer for Mr. Hersh and their dependents, 
with the St. Joseph’s Plan providing secondary coverage.  The St. Joseph’s Plan was the 
primary insurer for Mrs. Hersh only.  Id. at 1562. 
45Id. at 1561. 
46NDC argued that it was not required to offer continuation coverage, that estoppel cannot 
be used to modify an ERISA plan and that the damage award in excess of $1 million plus 
attorneys fees of $60,000 and 18% interest was excessive.  NDC did not appeal the district 
court’s award of injunctive relief which requires it to provide Robert Hersh and his dependents 
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Prior to his resignation to start his own business, Mr. Hersh had contacted several 
insurance companies regarding coverage for his wife’s existing pregnancy.  Because 
complications had already started to develop, the Hershes wanted to retain dual 
family coverage.47  The desire for dual coverage was communicated to NDC’s 
operation’s manager and Mr. Hersh was told that he would be eligible for 
continuation coverage under the National Plan.48  Mr. Hersh completed the “Election 
and Terms Continuation Coverage Agreement” which provided, in part: 
I understand I am eligible to continue health coverage as presently 
provided under the [National Plan] for up to 36 months subject to the 
following provisions: 
3. Coverage will be terminated prior to the 36 month period for any of the 
following reasons:  
a) Non-payment of premium by the covered person. 
b) Becoming eligible for Medicare. 
c) Becoming covered under another group health plan because of either 
employment or remarriage. 
d) Termination of the Plan.49 
 
Mr. Hersh paid the monthly premiums and National accepted and deposited these 
checks.50  Following the premature birth of the twins, who suffered from intrauterine 
growth retardation and respiratory distress syndrome, the Hershes submitted claims 
to both the National Plan and the St. Joseph Plan.51  It was recommended by the 
claims administrator for National that NDC retroactively revoke Mr. Hersh’s policy 
to the date of his resignation and deny the claims.52  All coverage was denied 
retroactively and National attempted to refund the premium payments plus ten 
percent interest.  Mr. Hersh did not accept the refunds and continued to make 
premium payments.53 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the existence of preexisting group health insurance 
coverage made Mr. Hersh effectively ineligible for continuation coverage under 
ERISA.54  In reviewing the Oakley decision the Eleventh Circuit noted the Tenth 
Circuit’s statement (in dicta) that there was a “gap” between Oakley’s coverage and 
                                                          
with thirty-six months of coverage starting from the date of Mr. Hersh’s resignation.  Id. at 
1565-66. 
47Id. at 1562-63.  One insurance company stated that it would cover her pregnancy.  Id. at 
1563. 
48National Cos. Health Benefit Plan, 929 F.2d at 1563. 
49Id. 
50Id. 
51Id. 
52Id. at 1564.  The St. Joseph Plan contended that the National Plan was primarily 
responsible, however they agreed to pay a portion of the medical claims of the children on an 
interim basis until the disputed coverage issues were resolved.  Id. 
53Id. 
54National Cos. Health Benefit Plan, 929 F.2d at 1568. 
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his spouse’s coverage.55  Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit noted with approval that 
the Brock court, also relying on the dicta in Oakley, held that “an employee is 
entitled to continuation coverage under her previous employer’s plan if there is a 
significant gap in the coverage provided to the employee under her spouse’s plan as 
compared with the employer’s plan.”56  
The Eleventh Circuit criticized the Tenth Circuit for the Oakley holding finding 
that the Oakley court “eroneously restricted the phrase ‘first becomes, after the date 
of election … covered,’ found in ERISA’s and the PHSA’s continuation coverage 
termination provision.”57  According to the Eleventh Circuit, Congress’ intentions 
were as follows: 
Congress was concerned with the lack of group health coverage after an 
employee left his job; therefore, the relevant time period is that following 
his continuation — coverage election.  In applying the termination 
provision at issue, then, it is clearly irrelevant whether an employee had 
other group health coverage prior to this election date — an employer 
cannot refuse to offer continuation coverage to  a former employee simply 
because that ex-employee had other group health coverage during his 
employment.  Instead, Congress allowed ERISA — plan sponsors to 
terminate continuation coverage only on the first date after the election 
date that the employee became covered under another group  health plan.  
Thus, it is immaterial when the employee acquires other group health 
coverage; the only relevant question is when, after the election date, does 
that other coverage take effect.  In the case of an employee covered by 
preexisting group health coverage, the terminating event occurs 
immediately; the first time after the election date that the employee 
becomes covered by a group health plan other than the employer’s plan is 
the moment after the election date.  In effect, such an employee is 
ineligible for continuation coverage.58 
E.  The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit held that an employee is not disqualified from obtaining 
COBRA continuation coverage because of preexisting coverage under her spouse’s 
employer’s group health insurance plan and that she only loses COBRA continuation 
coverage if she chooses to accept alternative group health insurance after the 
qualifying event.59  In Lutheran Hospital of Indiana, Inc. v. Business Men’s 
Assurance Co. of America, the plaintiff Mary Isch had group health insurance 
coverage under her employer’s plan provided by Business Men’s Assurance 
Company of America (BMA) and also under her husband’s group health insurance 
                                                                
55Id. at 1569. 
56Id. 
57Id. at 1570. 
58Id. 
59See Lutheran Hosp. of Indiana, Inc. v. Business Men’s Assurance Co. of America, 51 
F.3d 1308 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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plan provided by the Teamsters.60  After Mary Isch was stricken with Guillian Barre 
Syndrome she took a leave of absence from her teaching job and then was laid off 
for the summer.  Her employer switched insurers from BMA to Associated Insurance 
Companies, Inc. (Associated).  Associated told her employer that she would not be 
eligible for COBRA continuation coverage because of her coverage under the 
Teamster’s plan.61  Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action  to determine who 
was responsible for providing benefits. 
Since the holdings of the other circuits were conflicting, the Seventh Circuit 
attempted to effectuate Congress’ intent by analyzing the plain language of the 
statute as follows: 
The statute clearly provides that the employee’s right to continuation 
coverage terminates only when he or she first becomes, after the election 
date, covered by any other group health plan.  The statute does not say 
that an employee is ineligible for continuation coverage if he or she is 
covered by a preexisting group health plan.  Nor does the statute say that a 
beneficiary’s rights terminate when he or she becomes eligible for 
additional or alternative group health insurance.  Therefore, an employee 
loses the right to continuation coverage only if he or she chooses after the 
election date to accept coverage under another group health plan.62 
The court stated that the distinction between “preexisting” and “after acquired” 
coverage is reasonable and preserves the status quo.  The court also found that “the 
plain language of the statute dictates that an individual only loses COBRA eligibility 
if he or she chooses to accept alternative group health insurance after the qualifying 
event.”63  Based on the statute, the court determined that the employee has the choice 
to preserve the status quo and continue the same coverage with COBRA or accept 
alternative coverage by discontinuing COBRA but is never forced to accept a lower 
level of coverage during the eighteen or thirty-six month statutory period.64  
However, the court observed that if preexisting double coverage disqualifies the 
employee from COBRA continuation coverage the status quo is not preserved.  The 
court also noted that an employee will not be willing to pay the premiums of up to 
102% of the cost to continue COBRA coverage that is redundant or is not needed.65  
By focusing on the cases in which double coverage is not redundant the court found 
that the plain language of the statute does not force employees to accept inadequate 
                                                                
60Id. at 1310. 
61Id. 
62Id. at 1312. 
63Id.  
64Id. 
65Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1312. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Continuation Coverage 
Under COBRA:  A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 22 J. LEGIS. 195, 198 (1996) (The author 
argues that for employees with health problems the COBRA continuation coverage is a 
bargain because it is based on group rates and the purchase of an individual policy would be 
cost-prohibitive.  The author also argues that even at 102% the premium is a financial strain 
for the employer because COBRA beneficiaries greatly increase the average cost of 
coverage.).  Id. at 197. 
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coverage.66  The court also found that Congress did not intend COBRA to require 
only “bare bones” coverage without preservation of the employee’s status quo.67 
Further, the Seventh Circuit criticized the other courts “gap analysis” finding that 
the “gap analysis” was used to avoid the harsh result of a misreading the statute.68  
The “gap analysis” also invited “judicial line-drawing in the absence of any specific 
criteria much less congressional authorization.”69  The court also questioned how it 
should be determined whether or not a significant gap exists. Regarding this 
question, the Seventh Circuit stated that “courts should not ask or answer without 
congressional authorization or direction.”70  Instead the court found that “[t]he only 
gap that should be relevant and judicially cognizable is that perceived by the insured 
individual who chooses to pay the COBRA premiums to continue her additional 
coverage.”71  The court stated as follows: 
This whole morass can be avoided by honoring the language of the statute 
and the decision of the insured as to how much coverage is adequate for 
her own situation.  Under a proper application of the statute, the employee 
obtains no windfall.  She is only allowed to preserve the level of coverage 
she determined was appropriate before her termination and was willing to 
pay to continue afterward.72 
III.  STATE OF THE CASE:  GEISSAL V. MOORE MEDICAL CORPORATION 
A.  The Eighth Circuit 
James Geissal was fired from Moore Medical Corporation on July 16, 1993 after 
having worked there for more than seven years.73  At the time of his termination he 
was covered by both Moore’s group health insurance plan and his wife’s group 
health insurance plan with her employer Trans World Airlines (TWA).74  He also 
                                                                
66Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1312. 
67Id. at 1313. 
68Id. at 1313-14. ( “Courts which have held that preexisting coverage was disqualifying 
have attempted, under the guise of this “gap analysis,” to avoid the harshest results of their 
statutory misreading.”) 
69Id. at 1314. 
70Id.  “In the present case the district court compared the Teamsters and Associated plans 
and determined that there was no ‘significant’ gap, despite the fact that under the Teamsters 
plan the Isch family may be personally liable for $35,000” on a post hoc consideration.  Id.  
The district court attempted to put itself in the position of the employer at the time of the 
qualifying event finding that there was no significant gap because the Teamsters plan had a 
$250,000 yearly lifetime maximum but no lifetime limit, and the Associated plan had no 
yearly limit but a $1 million lifetime limit.  Id. 
71Id. at 1314. 
72Lutheran Hosp.,  51 F.3d at 1315. 
73Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 114 F.3d 1458, 1459 (8th Cir. 1997) rev’d, 141 L. Ed. 2d 
64 (1998). 
74Id. at 1459-60. 
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was suffering from cancer when he was fired from his job but was assured by Moore 
that he could maintain his group health insurance coverage under COBRA.75  He 
signed an “election form” for COBRA coverage and made premium payments which 
Moore accepted for six months before Moore advised him that he was ineligible for 
COBRA continuation coverage because he was already covered under TWA’s 
policy.76  Moore returned the premiums and the billings submitted by James 
Geissal’s medical care providers. 
James Geissal sued Moore alleging that the plan violated COBRA when it 
canceled his insurance coverage and also that Moore was equitably estopped from 
denying his insurance coverage.77  The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendant Moore holding that COBRA does not compel an employer, in 
most cases, to furnish continuation coverage to a discharged employee when the 
employee is insured under another group health plan and that the plaintiff had not 
proffered facts sufficient to substantiate his claim for equitable estoppel.78 
On appeal the plaintiff argued that according to the plain language of the statute 
“a person is disqualified from receiving continuation benefits only if he procures 
other coverage after he has chosen to secure COBRA insurance; otherwise, the 
individual does  not first become covered ‘under any other group health plan’ after 
the date of election.”79  The defendant argued that because James Geissal was a 
beneficiary under his wife’s group health plan, this statutory exception rendered it 
perfectly permissible to declare him ineligible for COBRA continuation benefits.80  
The Eighth Circuit held that unless there was a significant gap in the coverage 
afforded under Moore’s plan and the TWA plan, Moore was under no obligation to 
provide continuation coverage.81 
In arriving at it’s holding, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the conflicting opinions of 
the other circuits.  The Eighth Circuit noted that the holding of the Tenth Circuit in 
the Oakley case “allows termination of continuation benefits only if the beneficiary 
obtains other insurance after the date of election.”82  Citing the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis of the “plain language” of the statute, the Eighth Circuit reiterated the Tenth 
Circuit’s interpretation that Oakley did not “ ‘first become’ covered under his wife’s 
                                                                
75James Geissal also requested a “service letter” from Moore detailing the grounds for his 
discharge.  According to an affidavit filed with the district court he also declined to “consult 
with an attorney to investigate and to determine what rights and claims [he] might have [had] 
against Moore’” because Moore promised him COBRA coverage.  See id. at 1460 (quoting 
Geissal’s App. at 23). 
76Id. at 1460. 
77Id.  James Geissal died and his wife, Bonnie Geissal, was substituted as plaintiff.  Id. 
78Id. (citing Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 352,358-60 (E.D. Mo. 1996)). 
79Geissal, 114 F.3d at 1461. 
80Id. 
81Id. at 1464. 
82Id. at 1461 (citing Oakley v. City of Longmont, 890 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990)). 
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policy after the qualifying event that resulted in his termination from the City’s 
employment.”83   
The Eighth Circuit examined the Seventh Circuit opinion in Lutheran Hospital 
and found that the Seventh Circuit focused on Congress’ intent that a displaced 
employee maintain his insurance “status quo.”84  The Eighth Circuit reiterated the 
holding of the Lutheran Hospital court that “an employee loses the right to 
continuation coverage only if he or she chooses after the election date to accept 
coverage under another group health plan.”85  The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision that continuation benefits were crafted to allow an 
individual to maintain insurance “status quo” and stated that “Congress was 
fundamentally interested in making affordable health care temporarily available to 
those who would otherwise find themselves ‘without any health insurance 
coverage.’”86 
Noting that the “opinions of two other courts of appeals stand in direct 
contradiction to Lutheran Hosp[ital] and Oakley,” the Eighth Circuit arrived at its 
“significant gap” holding.87  Regarding the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in National 
Cos., the Eighth Circuit focused on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis that the 
continuation coverage terminated after the election date “when the employee became 
covered under another group health plan” and therefore “[i]n the case of an employee 
covered by preexisting group health coverage, the terminating event occurs 
immediately” causing the employee to be ineligible for continuation coverage.88  The 
Eighth Circuit also cited with approval the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that an 
employee with preexisting coverage is only entitled to continuation coverage if 
“‘there is a significant gap between the coverage afforded under his employer’s plan 
and his preexisting plan.’”89  The Eighth Circuit held that “COBRA authorizes the 
termination of continuation coverage on the day that a former employee becomes a 
beneficiary under ‘any other group health plan,’ and we think it is largely irrelevant 
under the Act whether the employee obtained that coverage before or after his 
COBRA rights are activated.”90 
Since James Geissal was covered by his wife’s group health plan, the Eighth 
Circuit held that Moore was justified in canceling his COBRA continuation coverage 
                                                                
83Id. at 1461-62 (quoting Oakley v. City of Longmont, 890 F.2d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990).at 1132. 
84Geissal, 114 F.3d at 1462 (citing Lutheran Hosp. of Indiana, Inc. v. Business Men’s 
Assurance Co. of America, 51 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (7th Cir. 1995). 
85Id. at 1462 (quoting Lutheran Hosp. 51 F.3d at 1312). 
86Id. at 1463 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-241, pt. 1, at 44 (1985), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 622). 
87Id. at 1463-64 (citing National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Atlanta, 
Inc., 929 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991) and Brock v. Primedica, Inc., 904 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 
1990)).  
88Id. at 1463 (quoting from National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of 
Atlanta, Inc., 929 F.2d 1558, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991). 
89Id. at 1463 (quoting from National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1571). 
90Geissal, 114 F.3d at 1463-64 (citations omitted). 
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unless there was a significant gap in the coverage.91  In determining whether there 
was a significant gap, the Eighth Circuit looked at “gap” tests applied by other 
courts. One court held that over $7,500 in personal liability constituted a significant 
gap.92  Another court held that a significant gap would occur where an employee, 
“despite his other coverage, will be liable personally for substantial medical 
expenses to his and his family’s detriment.”93  Determining that “post hoc” tests gave 
little guidance to employers on the front end, regarding whether termination of 
COBRA benefits is warranted the Eighth Circuit held that “a district court 
confronted with this question should measure the gap by comparing the policies’ 
provisions in light of information available to the employer on the day of the 
COBRA election.”94  Since Geissal failed to carry her burden of proving that there 
was a significant gap between the Moore and the TWA plans the Eighth Circuit 
found that it was impossible for the court to conclude that on the election date the 
TWA plan offered less benefits or limited coverage for James Geissal’s cancer 
condition.95 
The Eighth Circuit also requested assistance from either Congress or the Supreme 
Court.  Noting the attempts to grasp the true meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i) 
the court stated as follows: 
Our efforts, though unquestionably well intentioned, have inevitably led 
to at least two separate and irreconcilable interpretations of the law.  This 
deepening rift is extremely troublesome to us, especially given the 
proliferation of group health plans and the importance of guaranteeing 
equivalent protection to all ERISA beneficiaries throughout this nation.  
Accordingly, we suggest that some definitive action, originating either 
from Congress or the Supreme Court, might be appropriate.96 
B.  The Supreme Court 
On June 8, 1998, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and held that 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(i) does not allow an 
employer to deny COBRA continuation coverage to a qualified beneficiary who is 
covered under another group health plan at the time he makes his COBRA election.97  
The Court held that “there is no justification for disparaging the clarity of § 1162 
                                                                
91Id. at 1464. 
92See McGee v. Funderburg, 17 F.3d 1122, 1126 (8th Cir. 1994). 
93See National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1571. 
94Geissal, 114 F.3d at 1465. 
95Id. at 1465.  The TWA plan provided similar comprehensive medical benefits.  The only 
difference between the plans was that TWA’s yearly deductible was $350 more than the 
annual deductible under Moore’s plan and the two plans had separate lifetime maximums on 
benefits.  Id.  The Eighth Circuit also found that Geissal had not substantiated her allegations 
of detrimental reliance, and therefore the district court was correct in dismissing the equitable 
estoppel claim.  Id. at 1466. 
96Id. at 1465-66. 
97Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 141 L. Ed. 2d 64, 75 (1998). 
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(2)(D)(i).”98  The Court focused on the plain reading of the statutory language, “first 
becomes…covered,”99 and rejected Moore’s arguments that Congress meant to 
preserve the “status quo.”100  The Court also rejected the “significant gap” theory 
based on the absence of any statutory support and for social policy reasons.101  The 
Court found that the issue of whether the “gap” was “significant” enough was 
unsuitable for courts to determine without a clear mandate from Congress and further 
that Congress could not have intended that the courts be injected into the insurance 
policy arena.102  
1.  The Plain Reading of the Statute 
The Supreme Court determined that under the plain reading of the statute “first 
becomes . . . covered” means first and refers to a specific event.103  The Court stated 
that the event of “‘becom[ing] covered’. . . is significant only if occurs, and  ‘first’ 
occurs, at a time ‘after the date of the election.’”104  The employer is not excused 
from providing COBRA coverage if the beneficiary “is” covered or “remains” 
covered at the time of the election.105  The statute also does not specify whether the 
statute should be applied differently based on a finding that the insurance policy is 
primary or secondary.  The Court found that because James Geissal was 
continuously a beneficiary of TWA’s group health plan, he was covered before his 
COBRA election and therefore did not “first become” covered under the TWA plan 
after the date of the election.106  Based on the plain meaning of § 1162(2)(D)(i), 
Moore could not cut off Geissal’s COBRA coverage.107  
Moore interpreted the statute to mean that the first moment of prior coverage 
under a preexisting plan occurred after the election.108  The Court found that Moore’s 
interpretation ignored the plain language of the statute.109  The Supreme Court stated 
that Moore’s reading of the statute ignored the modifier  “first” and equated “first 
becomes … covered” with “remains covered.”110  Moore also argued a policy reason 
for its interpretation.  Since typically high risk individuals elect COBRA, Moore 
                                                                
98Id. at 75. 
99Id. at 72. 
100Id. at 73. 
101Id. at 74-75. 
102Id. at 75. 
103Geissal, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 72. 
104Id. at 72. 
105Id. 
106Id. 
107Id. 
108Id.  This argument was also made by the Eleventh Circuit in National Cos. Health 
Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1558, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991). 
109Geissal, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 72. 
110Id.  
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argued that the employer’s expense may cause employers to cease offering group 
health plans.111  The Court found that this factor may or may not be true, but if it 
were true, it would only be considered in construing the statute if it were vague.112 
The Court also rejected Moore’s argument that Congress could not have meant to 
give the qualified beneficiary more than the right to preserve the status quo.  Moore 
argued that under a plain reading of the statute, an employee is free to claim COBRA 
coverage even if he has obtained new group coverage between the date of the 
qualifying event and the election.113  The Court assumed that that situation should be 
termed an anomaly; however, it found that  Moore’s interpretation of Congress’ 
intent also produced an anomaly.114  The Court pointed out that Moore’s 
interpretation would have the election be ineffective to cover the eighteen or thirty-
six month period but would have the “surprising effect of providing continuous 
coverage for the period of weeks, or even days, between the event and the 
election.”115  Finding that Moore’s position defied normal language and common 
sense, the Court concluded that a line needed to be drawn somewhere between the 
two anomalies.116 
In rejecting Moore’s arguments regarding the anomalous consequesences, the 
Court also focused on the “interpretive morass to which it has led in practice.”117  
Moore cited the House Reports for the original COBRA Bill for support in its 
argument that Congress intended that individuals like Geissal were ineligible for 
COBRA continuation coverage.118  The Court found Moore’s position unpersuasive 
and noted that if this concern was a legitimate limit on the meaning of the statute that 
there would be no COBRA continuation coverage for any beneficiary with any 
health insurance on the date of election or any health insurance obtained thereafter.119 
2.  Significant Gap Theory 
Moore argued that even though Congress meant to deny COBRA coverage to 
individuals with other group insurance, if a “significant gap” existed between the two 
plans then the beneficiary should be eligible for COBRA continuation coverage.120  
Based on the “sheer absence of any statutory support,” the Supreme Court rejected 
                                                                
111Id. at 72-73. 
112Id. at 73. 
113Id. at 72-73. 
114Id. at 73. 
115Geissal, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 73. 
116Id. at 73. 
117Id. at 73-74. 
118Id. at 74 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-241, pt. 1 at 44 (1985) reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 622 (“The Committee [on Ways and Means] is concerned with reports of 
the growing number of Americans without any health insurance coverage and the  decreasing 
willingness of our Nation’s hospitals to provide care to those who cannot afford to pay.”). 
119Id. at 74. 
120Id.  
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the significant gap theory.121  The Court found that the statute specifies that later-
acquired coverage does not terminate COBRA rights when there is a limit in the 
later-acquired coverage for a preexisting condition.122  This is the “gap” that 
Congress was legislating about and not the gap or difference in coverage between the 
COBRA plan and the non-COBRA plan.123  The Court found no difficulty applying 
the statute as written because once the preexisting condition was identified all a court 
would have to do is look at the later-acquired policy to see if that condition were 
excluded or limited.124  If the later acquired policy excluded or limited coverage for 
the preexisting condition COBRA continuation coverage would be left undisturbed.  
If not, the new coverage would automatically halt the COBRA coverage. 
The main problem with the “significant gap” theory was a social policy one.  
Courts were placed in the position of making judgments about not only the adequacy 
of the medical coverage but if the two policies were not identical, whether the gap in 
coverage between them was “significant” enough.125  The Supreme Court found two 
powerful reasons to reject the significant gap analysis.  First, this type of judgment is 
unsuitable for courts particularly without a clear mandate from Congress.126  Second, 
Congress could not have intended that the courts should determine the adequacy of 
non-COBRA coverage in place prior to the election of COBRA while at the same 
time limiting the judicial intrusion by leaving the beneficiary to the terms of the non-
COBRA coverage that became effective after the election.127  Finding no 
congressional intent that the courts be injected into the policy arena the Supreme 
Court held that there was “no justification for disparaging the clarity of § 1162 
(2)(D)(i).128   
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY REVERSED THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
A.  The Plain Reading of the Statute 
The Supreme Court was correct in reversing the Eighth Circuit’s opinion.  As 
long as the employee bears the risk and pays the premiums during the limited time 
period provided by COBRA, the courts should not supplant their own views as to 
what constitutes adequate coverage or whether a “significant gap” exists.129  This is 
the only result that clearly follows the plain language of the statute and applies the 
“first becomes, after” language in the statute.  The statute clearly contemplates 
termination only by after-acquired coverage based on the “first becomes, after” 
                                                                
121Geissal, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 74.  
122Id.  
123Id. at 74-75. 
124Id. at 75. 
125Id. 
126Id. 
127Geissal, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 75. 
128Id. 
129Lutheran Hosp. of Indiana, Inc. v. Business Men’s Assoc. of Americ, 51 F.3d 1308, 
1314 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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language.  Moreover, the amendments demonstrate that continuation coverage is 
terminated by reemployment or remarriage but not by after-acquired coverage that 
contains preexisting condition exclusions or limitations. 
The Fifth Circuit erred in the Brock case by misreading the statute.130  The Fifth 
Circuit totally ignored the “first becomes, after the date of the election” language of 
the statute.  The 1989 amendment to the statute providing for coverage “which does 
not contain any exclusions or limitations with respect to any preexisting condition” 
did not amend the “first becomes, after” language.  In fact, none of the three 
amendments made to 29 U.S.C.§ 1162(2)(D)(i) amended the “first becomes, after” 
language.  It must be presumed therefore that the legislature knows what it said and 
intended that the words have their plain meaning. 
The Seventh Circuit, in reviewing the case law in the other circuits, noted that the 
Tenth Circuit in the Oakley case held that “the clear language of the statute ‘cannot 
be construed to include a spouse’s preexisting group plan as a condition to terminate 
continuation coverage.’”131  The Seventh Circuit also noted the comment made in 
dicta by the Oakley court.132  Regarding the Brock case, the Seventh Circuit stated, 
the Fifth Circuit ignored the clear holding of the Oakley court and 
fastened instead on the above-quoted reference to a “gap,” holding that 
since the plaintiff, Karin Brock, suffered no gap between her employer’s 
plan and her  preexisting coverage under her husband’s plan she was not 
entitled to continuation coverage.133 
Therefore, the Brock holding was not persuasive to the Supreme Court and in fact 
the Court rejected the lower court’s misinterpretation of the “gap” referred to 
above.134  
The Eleventh Circuit also clearly disregarded the plain meaning of the “first 
becomes” language of the statute in its interpretation of Congress’ intentions in the 
National Cos. case.  There would be no reason in having the word “first” modify the 
word “becomes” if Congress intended preexisting insurance coverage to “take 
effect” after the election date.  And in fact preexisting coverage does not “take 
effect” after the election date but is “in effect” before the election date making the 
                                                                
130Procedurally, the plaintiff in Brock v. Primedica lost on both the COBRA issue and the 
estoppel issue.  She lost on the COBRA issue because the Fifth Circuit attempting to reconcile 
the case with Oakley held that since Brock suffered no significant gap in coverage between her 
policy and her husband’s policy that she was not entitled to COBRA continuation coverage.  
Since plaintiff paid her premiums however, she should have won on the estoppel issue.  The 
reason she lost on the estoppel issue is because her attorney evidently failed to raise the issue 
at the appropriate time and did not raise it until the appeal.  Brock v. Primedica, 904 F.2d 295, 
296-97 5th Cir. 1990).  The case also does not specify the amount of plaintiff’s medical claims 
except to state that benefits were paid by her husband’s policy.  The dismissal of the claim for 
insurance benefits was also warranted by the Brocks’ failure to exhaust the insurance plan’s 
administrative review procedure prior to initiating suit.  Id. at 297, nn.1-2. 
131Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1311 (quoting from Oakley v. Longmont, 890 F.2d 1128, 
1132 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990)). 
132Id. at 1311. 
133Id. 
134See Geissal, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 74-75. 
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coverage contrary to the plain meaning of the statute’s “first becomes, after the date 
of the election…covered” language.135  The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that 
preexisting coverage does not “take effect” until after the election date is patently 
wrong; and therefore, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in National Cos. was not 
persuasive.136  Instead, the Supreme Court correctly followed the analyses of the 
Tenth Circuit in Oakley and the Seventh Circuit in Lutheran Hospital. 
B.  Significant Gap Theory 
1.  There is no Support in the Statute for the Significant Gap Theory 
The significant gap theory was created as a result of a misreading of the statute.137  
This “gap” theory is also not supported by Congress’ intentions.  It is merely dicta 
from the Oakley case that the Brock court used to support its finding that since a 
“gap” occurred in Oakley but not in Brock, the cases were distinguishable.138  There 
is nothing in the original statute or its three amendments that supports a theory that 
the beneficiary loses COBRA continuation coverage unless a significant gap exists in 
the preexisting coverage or the after-acquired coverage of the beneficiary. Instead, 
the statute is clear that the only “gap” that is addressed is coverage that contains 
exclusions or limitations for preexisting conditions.139  Furthermore, the “exclusions 
or limitations” language also appears after the “first becomes, after” language in the 
statute which means that only after-acquired coverage and not preexisting coverage 
is contemplated.  
2.  The Significant Gap Theory is Unworkable 
Courts that have utilized a “gap analysis” have been inconsistent.  The Eleventh 
Circuit, for example, in National Cos.140 found that $6,700 was not a significant gap 
in coverage, whereas the Eighth Circuit in McGee v. Funderburg141 found that 
$7,600 was a significant gap and thus allowed COBRA continuation coverage 
without reaching the issue of whether preexisting double coverage was disqualifying. 
                                                                
135Id. 
136The National Companies case also has little precedential value.  This Eleventh Circuit 
case is about equitable estoppel.  The holding, regarding the Hershes ineligibility for 
continuation coverage, has no real meaning because National was equitably estopped from 
denying such insurance coverage for a period of 36 months from the date of Robert Hersh’s 
resignation including the medical treatment of the twins.  National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. 
St. Joseph Hosp. of Atlanta, Inc., 929 F.2d 1558, 1572 & n.13 (11th Cir. 1991). 
137Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1314. 
138Id. 
139See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, supra note 21. 
140National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1571.  The Eleventh Circuit found that the $6,700 financial 
responsibility occurred as a result of not having  dual coverage, “not because the St. Joseph’s 
Plan is inadequate. . . . [T]he National Plan alone would not put the Hershes in any better 
position.”  Id.  The court never explained however, how it could reconcile its conclusion that 
this was not a significant gap between duplicate and single coverage particularly since dual 
coverage is what the Hershes desired. 
141McGee v. Funderburg, 17 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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Post hoc determinations by a court after serious medical expenses have been 
incurred are not workable and have resulted in plaintiffs being liable for considerable 
out of pocket expenses even though courts have found insignificant gaps in 
coverage.142  An employer’s attempt to determine on the date of termination whether 
an employee’s spouse’s coverage imposes a significant gap is also inappropriate 
since the employer stands to gain if he can eliminate future potential medical claims 
by the terminated employee.  
3.  The Adequacy of Coverage Should be Determined by the Beneficiary 
The beneficiary is in the best position to determine the adequacy of group health 
insurance coverage to the extent that he or she is willing to pay a premium of up to 
102% of the cost of group health insurance for the privilege of maintaining the same 
coverage or having dual coverage if necessary.143  The Supreme Court correctly held 
that the statute does not allow an employer to deny COBRA continuation coverage to 
a qualified beneficiary who is covered under another group health plan at the time of 
the COBRA election.144  The employee should have the choice to continue the same 
coverage with COBRA or accept alternative coverage by discontinuing COBRA but 
should never be forced to lose COBRA benefits as a result of a spouse’s preexisting 
coverage. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court was correct in interpreting the plain wording of the statute 
and in interpreting Congress’ intentions in passing COBRA.  There is no support in 
the statute for Moore’s and other lower court’s interpretations that Congress meant 
for the “status quo” to outweigh the plain meaning of the statute and Congress’ 
intent.  The “significant gap” theory is unworkable ad hoc from an employer’s 
standpoint and unworkable post hoc from a judicial standpoint.  Congress never 
intended to inject the courts into the health insurance arena to determine whether 
differences in insurance coverage were “significant” enough to trigger the statute’s 
continuation coverage.  The person who is in the best position to determine whether 
a “significant gap” in coverage prior to the COBRA election is the beneficiary.  If 
the beneficiary is willing to pay the 102% premium to maintain the status quo which 
may even be dual coverage for eighteen or thirty-six months the courts should 
uphold continuing COBRA coverage.  If the gap theory was the intent of Congress, it 
is up to that body to define and incorporate such criteria into the law so that 
employees can balance their options in making the coverage elections.  For these 
reasons, the Supreme Court correctly reversed the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Geissal 
and held that he was not disqualified from COBRA continuation coverage based on 
his wife’s employer’s group health coverage. 
                                                                
142National Cos., 929 F.2d at 1571. 
143Lutheran Hosp., 51 F.3d at 1312. 
144Geissal, 141 L. Ed. 2d at 68. 
